Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers (>> Mo.Fi.R. website) |
||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
102 | Claudia Pigini, Andrea Filippo Presbitero, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
State Dependence in Access to Credit [dicembre 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Credit constraints, Discouraged borrowers, First-order Markov model, State dependence | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
C33- | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables – Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series | |||||||||||||||||
C35- | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables – Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions | |||||||||||||||||
F33- | International Economics – International Finance – International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions | |||||||||||||||||
F34- | International Economics – International Finance – International Lending and Debt Problems | |||||||||||||||||
F35- | International Economics – International Finance – Foreign Aid | |||||||||||||||||
O11- | Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth – Economic Development – Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
We present a simple theory and an empirical test for state dependence in firm access to credit. We estimate a first-order Markov model of credit restriction with sample selection that makes it possible to estimate state dependence in the presence of feedback effects and observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The results, based on a representative sample of Italian firms, show that state dependence in access to credit is a statistical and economically significant: experiencing a credit restriction in the past has a negative impact on the outcome of the current loan application and the decision to apply for a new loan. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
101 | Andrea Filippo Presbitero, Roberta Rabellotti | |||||||||||||||||
Is Access to Credit a Constraint for Latin American Enterprises? An Empirical Analysis with Firm-Level Data [novembre 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
announcement, bank, event study, financial crisis, rescue plan | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G01- | Financial Economics – General – Financial Crises | |||||||||||||||||
G21- | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
N20- | Economic History – Financial Markets and Institutions – General, International, or Comparative | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
An intense process of deregulation and financial liberalization in Latin America has increased competitive pressures and led to bank restructuring and consolidation. This paper looks at firm access to credit in the region, focusing on the role of credit market structure. Using firm-level data from theWorld Bank Enterprise Survey, we find that access to bank credit is very heterogeneous. On average, smaller and less productive firms are less likely to apply for credit and more likely to be financially constrained. We also find that a high degree of bank penetration and competition are significantly correlated with a lower probability that borrowers are financially constrained. Foreign banks penetration has a negative effect on access to credit particularly in less developed and more concentrated markets, while it has a positive influence in more competitive and financially developed markets. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
100 | Michele Fratianni, Francesco Marchionne | |||||||||||||||||
Bank asset reallocation and sovereign debt [settembre 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
crisis, loans, mutual protection pacr, regulator, securities | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G01- | Financial Economics – General – Financial Crises | |||||||||||||||||
G11- | Financial Economics – General Financial Markets – Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions | |||||||||||||||||
G21- | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
G28- | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Government Policy and Regulation | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper examines how banks around the world have resized and reallocated their earning assets in response to the subprime and sovereign debt crises. We focus especially on the interaction between sovereign debt and the bank asset allocation process. After the crisis we observe a general substitution away from loans and in favor of securities. Our econometric findings corroborate that banks have readjusted the composition of their assets and the overall regulatory credit risk by substituting securities for loans. Banks, furthermore, have also been sensitive to those variables that are of direct interest to the regulator. The picture that emerges is a mutual protection pact regime, in which high-debt governments exert pressure on banks– either through the regulatory system or through moral suasion– to privilege the purchase of government securities over credit to the private sector in exchange for receiving protection against default. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
99 | Marco Cucculelli, Lidia Mannarino, Valeria Pupo, Fernanda Ricotta | |||||||||||||||||
Owner-management, firm age and productivity in Italian family firms [settembre 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Family firms, Management, TFP | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
D24- | Microeconomics – Production and Organizations – Production; Cost; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity | |||||||||||||||||
G34- | Financial Economics – Corporate Finance and Governance – Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Using Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a measure of corporate performance, we find that Italian family-run firms are less productive than firms run by outside managers and the result is robust to potential endogeneity of management regime. This difference tends to vanish when the age of the firms is taken into account. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
98 | Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli, Aleksander Surdej | |||||||||||||||||
Transnational ties and performance of immigrant entrepreneurs: the case of IT industry in Italy [settembre 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
ICT industry, Italy, ethnic business ties, immigrants’ firms’ performance, transnational entrepreneurship | ||||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This study contributes to the recent empirical literature on the performance of transnational immigrants’ firms by investigating the effect of transnational ties on the firm’s growth. In addition to the effect of the ties, the paper shows that home-country’s institutional and socio-economic characteristics and country-specific entrepreneurial factors have a crucial role in shaping the ties-performance relationship. The evidence from a sample of immigrantowned firms in the Italian ICT sector in the period 2000-2010 confirmed the relevance of the proposed model and helped in understanding a potential channel of improvements in immigrant firms’ performance through transnational ties. Our results show the limited relevance of a direct, or linear, impact of ties on the growth of sales in immigrant-run firms in the ICT sector, whereas supports the crucial moderating role of home country characteristics on the ties-performance relationship. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
97 | Giulia Bettin, Riccardo Lucchetti | |||||||||||||||||
Steady streams and sudden bursts: persistence patterns in remittance decisions [luglio 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Discrete panel data models, Migration, Persistence, Remittances, State dependence | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
C23- | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Single Equation Models; Single Variables – Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series | |||||||||||||||||
C25- | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Single Equation Models; Single Variables – Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions | |||||||||||||||||
F22- | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – International Migration | |||||||||||||||||
F24- | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – Remittances | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper is the first systematic attempt to investigate the factors affecting time persistence in remittance behaviour at the individual level. We argue that the time profile of remittance ows from individual migrants is of considerable theoretical relevance and also has very important policy implications. By using micro-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) we apply a wide variety of discrete choice (static and dynamic) panel models and show that persistence occurs at the individual level due to observable characteristics (individual income, household characteristics, etc.) but also to time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics. In addition, remittance decisions seem to be signicantly infl uenced by “true state dependence”, namely correlation between past actual behaviour and future propensity to remit. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
96 | Luca Papi | |||||||||||||||||
Le autorità indipendenti nel settore bancario [luglio 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Negli ultimi anni la diffusione delle autorità indipendenti ha rappresentato un importante tratto distintivo dell’evoluzione istituzionale di gran parte dei paesi. La corrispondente delega di poteri è stata giustificata con la necessaria autonomia dal potere politico ed economico, nell’ipotesi che le autorità indipendenti siano la risposta istituzionale più efficace per perseguire gli interessi pubblici. Questa impostazione si basa su tre principali presupposti la cui validità è storicamente e geograficamente determinata. Il lavoro esamina le autorità indipendenti del settore bancario e finanziario, spiegandone l’evoluzione e i profili di autonomia e di accountability. I cambiamenti della regolamentazione e del ruolo delle autorità vengono messi in relazione agli sviluppi internazionali e alla loro continua trasformazione, anche alla luce delle ricorrenti crisi finanziarie. Infine il lavoro si interroga su quale debba essere l’assetto istituzionale ottimale in termini di divisione/integrazione delle responsabilità di vigilanza in ambito bancario/finanziario. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
95 | Andrea Filippo Presbitero, Agnese Sacchi, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Property Tax and Fiscal Discipline in OECD Countries [maggio 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal imbalance, Property tax, Sub-national governments, Tax decentralization | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
E62- | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics – Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook – Fiscal Policy | |||||||||||||||||
H62- | Public Economics – National Budget, Deficit, and Debt – Deficit; Surplus | |||||||||||||||||
H71- | Public Economics – State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations – State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue | |||||||||||||||||
H77- | Public Economics – State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations – Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper investigates the effects of property taxation on fiscal discipline for a sample of OECD countries over the period 1973-2011. We find that aggregate property taxation in total tax revenues is not statistically correlated with the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, a greater reliance on property taxes pertaining to sub-national governments contributes to fiscal discipline, suggesting that fiscal decentralization should favor responsive tax base instruments. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
94 | Michele Fratianni, John Pattison | |||||||||||||||||
Basel III, Clubs and Eurozone Asymmetries [marzo 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Basel III clubs, Eurozone, asymmetries, financial regulation | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
F33- | International Economics – International Finance – International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions | |||||||||||||||||
F36- | International Economics – International Finance – Financial Aspects of Economic Integration | |||||||||||||||||
F42- | International Economics – Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance – International Policy Coordination and Transmission | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Financial regulation has shifted from a system managed as an oligopoly dominated by the G2/G5 to expanded clubs like the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Expansive clubs have to agree to terms that are closer to the preferences of soft-regulation members. Yet, once a global agreement on minimum standards, such as Basel III, is reached, the transposition is left to national or regional regulators. Deviations from the Basel III standards are bound to occur; the complexity of the agreement will facilitate an asymmetric implementation of national regulation and supervision. On the high side, countries like the US, UK, Australia, some Scandinavian countries and Canada have chosen higher standards. On the low side, we should expect deviations to take place in those member countries of the Eurozone that are heterogeneous, have different preferences and tradeoffs between regulatory stringency and economic activity. The requirements of both global clubs and the EU regional club for transparency, monitoring and a level playing field will cause a collision between the interests of the clubs and their members. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
93 | Giulia Bettin, Andrea Filippo Presbitero, Nikola Spatafora | |||||||||||||||||
Remittances and vulnerability in developing countries [gennaio 2014] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Business Cycle, Gravity Model, Remittances, Shocks, Vulnerability | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
F33- | International Economics – International Finance – International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions | |||||||||||||||||
F34- | International Economics – International Finance – International Lending and Debt Problems | |||||||||||||||||
F35- | International Economics – International Finance – Foreign Aid | |||||||||||||||||
O11- | Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth – Economic Development – Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper examines how international remittances are affected by structural characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and adverse shocks in both source and recipient economies. We exploit a novel, rich panel data set, covering bilateral remittances from 103 Italian provinces to 107 developing countries over the period 2005-2011. We find that remittances are negatively correlated with the business cycle in recipient countries, and increase especially strongly in response to adverse exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters or large declines in the terms of trade. Remittances are also positively correlated with economic conditions in the source province. Nevertheless, in the presence of similar negative shocks to both source and recipient economies, remittances remain counter-cyclical with respect to the recipient country. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
|