Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers (>> Mo.Fi.R. website) |
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134 | Wildmer Daniel Gregori, Agnese Sacchi | |||||||||||||||||
Has the Grexit news spilled over into euro area financial markets? The role of domestic political leaders, supranational executives and institutions [Dicembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Grexit, Financial markets, Government bond, News, Spillovers, Euro area, GARCH. | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
E43 | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics – Money and Interest Rates — Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects | |||||||||||||||||
E62 | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics – Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook — Fiscal Policy | |||||||||||||||||
G12 | Financial Economics – General Financial Markets — Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates | |||||||||||||||||
G14 | Financial Economics – General Financial Markets — Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper investigates whether speculation about Greece’s exit from the euro has spilled over into other euro area countries’ sovereign bond yields. Our empirical analysis is based on more than 64,000 news items on Grexit between December 2014 and October 2015, collected daily via the Factiva database. We can take account of Grexit news generally and, also, distinguish news items according to individual country press, domestic political leaders, supranational executives and institutions. Our results suggest that more news about Grexit drives up bond yields in European peripheral countries, but that there are no effects on European core countries. Thus, speculations about Grexit seem to be confined to more vulnerable economies. In addition, financial markets in peripheral countries react more to Grexit news associated to supranational executives and related institutions compared to news related to domestic politicians and European political bodies, due possibly to higher perceived credibility of the former with respect to the latter. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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133 | Andrea Bellucci, Luca Pennacchio, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Public subsidies for SME research and development: Empirical evaluation of collaborative versus individual place-based programs [Dicembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Research and innovation; place-based regional subsidies; impact evaluation, small- and mediumsized firms, collaborative research programs. | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G32 | Financial Economics – Corporate Finance and Governance — Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill | |||||||||||||||||
H81 | Public Economics – Miscellaneous Issues — Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts | |||||||||||||||||
L52 | Industrial Organization – Regulation and Industrial Policy — Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods | |||||||||||||||||
O38 | Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth – Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights — Government Policy | |||||||||||||||||
R58 | Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics – Regional Government Analysis — Regional Development Planning and Policy | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This paper provides novel empirical evidence on the effectiveness of regional research and innovation policies for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). Two subsidy programs implemented at the regional level in central Italy are investigated. One program targeted firms’ individual research, while the other addressed collaborative research between firms and universities. Using a matched difference-in-differences approach our empirical analysis shows a differentiated impact of the two programs. The first was successful in stimulating additional private R&D investment and, at least partially, in improving firms. performance. The second program had weaker effects, mostly restricted to R&D expenditure and employment. Otherwise, subsidized firms show a reduction in their tangible and intangible investments, thus casting doubts on the benefits of subsidies forcing R&D collaborations. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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132 | Giorgio Calcagnini, Germana Giombini, Giuseppe Travaglini | |||||||||||||||||
How labor regulation a.ects innovation and investment: A neo-Schumpeterian approach. [Dicembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Endogenous growth model; Labor regulation; Innovation, Investment. | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
O4 | Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth – Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity | |||||||||||||||||
J5 | Labor and Demographic Economics – Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Theoretical and empirical models provide ambiguous responses on the relationship between labor regulation, innovation and investment. Labor regulation tends to raise firms. adjustment costs. But, also, labor regulation stimulates firms to make innovations and investment to recover productivity in the long-run. In this paper we present a neo- Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, which explains how these opposite forces operate over time, and why a stricter labor regulation may positively a.ect innovation and investment. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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131 | Giorgio Calcagnini, Germana Giombini, Francesco Perugini | |||||||||||||||||
Bank Foundations, Social Capital, and the Growth of Italian Provinces [Novembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Bank Foundations; social capital; economic growth | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G23 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services — Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors | |||||||||||||||||
O47 | Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth – Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity — Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence | |||||||||||||||||
C13 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General — Estimation: General | |||||||||||||||||
R11 | Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics – General Regional Economics — Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The funding role of Bank Foundations in the Italian economy, especially to the non-profit sector, significantly increased over the last twenty-five years. By means of a novel measure of social capital, our paper evaluates the contribution of Bank Foundations to the economic development of Italian provinces. Our findings suggest that Bank Foundations positively affect social capital and the economic growth of provinces. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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130 | Riccardo De Bonis | |||||||||||||||||
What Piketty said in Capital in the Twenty-first Century and how economists reacted [Novembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
ratio household wealth/GDP; distribution of income and wealth; taxation; welfare State | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
C80 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs — General | |||||||||||||||||
D14 | Microeconomics – Household Behavior — Household Saving; Personal Finance | |||||||||||||||||
D31 | Microeconomics – D3: Distribution — Personal Income and Wealth Distribution | |||||||||||||||||
D91 | Microeconomics – Intertemporal Choice — Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving | |||||||||||||||||
E62 | Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics – Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook — Fiscal Policy | |||||||||||||||||
H26 | Public Economics – Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue — Tax Evasion and Avoidance | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
This work rehearses the main themes of Piketty’s book and summarizes the debate it triggered. The paper dwells on the rise in the ratio of household wealth to GDP in the rich countries since the 1980s and the role played by the build-up of saving and variations in house and financial asset prices; on the various justifications put forward for the increasing income and wealth inequality that has accompanied the rise in the wealth/income ratio, especially in the US and Britain; on the relationship between the rate of return on capital and the economic growth rate; on the ties between rising income inequality and the financial crisis of 2007-08; on the feasibility of Piketty’s proposals for higher taxation of top incomes and a progressive global tax on net household wealth; and on the progress that has been made in the US and Europe in exchanging information on citizens’ income and foreign assets. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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129 | Marianna Astore, Michele Fratianni | |||||||||||||||||
“We can’t pay”: How Italy cancelled war debts after Lausanne [Novembre 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Italy, foreign debt, debt restructuring, default. | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
H63 | Public Economics – – National Budget, Deficit, and Debt – – – Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt | |||||||||||||||||
N44 | Economic History – – Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation – – – Europe: 1913- | |||||||||||||||||
N94 | Economic History – – Regional and Urban History – – – Europe: 1913- | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The paper deals with Italian inter-war debts, against the background of the very contentious international issue of war reparations that many Allied nations wanted to link to war debt repayments. While the bulk of the literature looks at the Lausanne conference of 1932 as an act of forgiveness of war debts, we show that Italy, having first achieved an extremely large haircut by restructuring US and UK debts in 1925-26, defaulted after Lausanne. We also present a new times series on Italian foreign debt from 1925 to 1934, a series that is consistent with the unfolding of relevant historical events. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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128 | Marco Cucculelli, Valentina Peruzzi, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Learning from crisis: Relational capital in lending relationships: Evidence from European family firms [Agosto 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Family firm, family CEO, soft-information, relational capital, relationship lending, credit rationing. | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
D22 | Microeconomics – Production and Organizations – Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis | |||||||||||||||||
G21 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
G22 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
In this paper we empirically investigate the effects of active family involvement in the company.s management on bank-firm lending relationships and access to credit. Based on the trade-off between relational and management human capital, we explore whether the relational capital embodied in the family leadership of the company influences the lending relationships with the main bank in terms of information sensitivity and duration. Then, we test whether family firms with family CEOs are more likely to experience a credit restriction from banks than family firms appointing professional CEOs external to the family. Results indicate that family businesses appointing family managers are significantly more likely to maintain soft-information-based and longer-lasting lending relationships. However, having family executives does not have a negative impact on firm.s access to credit, while the creation of soft-information-based and long-lasting lending relationships significantly reduces the likelihood of experiencing credit restrictions. In view of these findings, family relational capital seems to have a univocal beneficial impact on bank-firm relationship in our sample. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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127 | Giulia Bettin, Riccardo Lucchetti, Claudia Pigini | |||||||||||||||||
State dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in a double hurdle model for remittances: evidence from immigrants to Germany | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Migration; Remittances; State dependence; Double hurdle; Intertemporal choices; | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
F22 | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – International Migration | |||||||||||||||||
F24 | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – Remittances | |||||||||||||||||
C23 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Single Equation Models; Single Variables – Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models | |||||||||||||||||
C34 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables – Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models | |||||||||||||||||
C35 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables – Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The empirical modelling of remitting behaviour has been the object of a considerable amount of micro-level literature. The increasing availability of panel datasets makes it possible to explore the persistence in transfer decisions as a result of intertemporal choices, that may be consistent with several motivations to remit. Building a dynamic model with panel data poses the additional problem of dealing properly with permanent unobserved heterogeneity; moreover, the specific censored nature of international transfers has to be accounted for as well. In this paper, we propose a dynamic, random-effects double hurdle model for remittances: we combine the Maximum Likelihood estimator of the traditional double hurdle model for cross-section data (Jones, 1989) with the approach put forward by Heckman (1981b) for dealing with state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in a non-linear setting. Our empirical evidence based on the German SOEP dataset suggests that there is significant state dependence in remitting behaviour consistent with migrants. intertemporal allocation of savings; at the same time, transaction costs are likely to affect the steadiness of transfers over time. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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126 | Barbara Ermini, Luca Papi, Francesca Scaturro | |||||||||||||||||
Over-education among italian Ph.D. graduates. Does the crisis make a difference? [July 29, 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
over-education; over-skilling; over-qualification; Ph.D graduates; crisis; | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
C2 | Mathematical and Quantitative Methods – Single Equation Models; Single Variables | |||||||||||||||||
I2 | ealth, Education, and Welfare – Education | |||||||||||||||||
I23 | Health, Education, and Welfare – Education – Higher Education; Research Institutions | |||||||||||||||||
J24 | Labor and Demographic Economics – Demand and Supply of Labor – Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The paper examines the determinants of over-education among Italian Ph.D graduates drawn from the four cohorts 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 surveyed by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We attempt to disentangle the differentiated effects of the economic crisis and the university reform that recently hit the Italian labour market. We examine over-education through the definitions of over-skilling, over-qualification and a combination of the two. The results show that socio-demographic variables do not exert a relevant influence on over-education. Conversely, job attributes such as working in academia or carrying out R&D activities reduce the likelihood of incurring into over-education. Instead, accessing the job via informal channels or working as self-employed increase the risk of over-education, with a stronger effect during the recession. Among Ph.D related features, visiting abroad is always a driver to overcome any kind of job mismatch. Generally, benefiting from financial support is a propelling factor to reduce over-education; it is effective in reducing qualification mismatch especially during the downturn. In the light of the above findings, some policy advices are proposed. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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125 | Pietro Alessandrini, Michele Fratianni, Luca Papi, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
The asymmetric burden of regulation: will local banks survive? [Giugno 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
banking regulation; local banks; large banks; regions; asymmetries; heterogeneity | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G01 | Financial Economics – General – Financial Crises | |||||||||||||||||
G18 | Financial Economics – General Financial Markets – Government Policy and Regulation | |||||||||||||||||
G21 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The re-regulation wave following the recent financial crisis has contributed to produce a complex system of new rules and controls. The paper argues that the burden of this new regulatory system is asymmetric and penalizing for small banks. This conclusion is corroborated from the preliminary results of a questionnaire on the impact of regulation on different types of Italian banks. Asymmetric effects on banking structure produce related asymmetries on firms and regional economies, in light of the fact that small firms and peripheral regions are highly dependent on bank credit and need strategic proximity of banking structures. When firms and regions are heterogeneous, the review of the literature on different countries and on different periods of time suggests the importance of differentiated banking models. Bank size, organization and governance should be evaluated in relative terms reflecting various heterogeneities of clients and regions. Consequently, a regulatory system should not favor one particular bank type but should aim at achieving a more symmetric distribution of the regulatory burden. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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124 | Pietro Alessandrini, Michele Fratianni, Luca Papi, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Banks, regions and development after the crisis and under the new regulatory system [Maggio 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
financial crisis; regulation; small banks; large banks; asymmetries; heterogeneity | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G01 | Financial Economics – General – Financial Crises | |||||||||||||||||
G18 | Financial Economics – General Financial Markets – Government Policy and Regulation | |||||||||||||||||
G21 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
One of the most evident consequences of the Great Financial Crisis has been a rapid expansion of banking regulation. We argue that the burden of the new regulatory system is asymmetric, driving small banks to the “too-small-to-survive” zone, while reinforcing the “too-big-to-fail” protection for big banks. The asymmetric effect on banking structure produces related asymmetries on firms and regional economies, in light of the fact that small firms and peripheral regions are highly dependent on bank credit and need strategic proximity of banking structures. Finally, our review of the literature on different countries and on different periods of time, including the financial crisis years, suggests the importance of a differentiated banking model when firms and regions are heterogeneous. There is no obvious optimal size of bank. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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123 | Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli | |||||||||||||||||
Learning from crisis: a systematic literature review [aprile 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
organizational learning; crisis; economic recession | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
D83 | Microeconomics – Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty – Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness | |||||||||||||||||
L22 | Industrial Organization – Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior – Firm Organization and Market Structure | |||||||||||||||||
L25 | Industrial Organization – Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior – Firm Performance | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
The recent economic crisis has revived the interest on the reactions to the recession pursued by the entrepreneurs. Understanding how to act in troubled times becomes an asset which is vital for the firm survival, and to the future competitive advantage after the economic recovery. This papers reviews the state of the art on the firms. reaction to economic crisis and on the firms. ability to learn from previous events. The study aims at identifying the main trends and findings in this research field. Based on the Scopus and Web of Science indexes, the systematic review of the literature is carried out on the sample of 38 papers, by investigating the objectives, geographical coverage, methodologies and results. Consequently, most important gaps in knowledge on the learning from crisis research have been identified and most promising topics are described. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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122 | Giovanni Ferri, Zeno Rotondi | |||||||||||||||||
Misure del rischio di credito nel finanziamento delle imprese e incidenza dei prestiti in default: un’analisi comparata per le banche europee [aprile 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
We hypothesize that Italian banks suffer a competitive disadvantage in business lending. We estimate two cross sections of about 100 European banks for 2013: the first on the determinants of exposure to credit risk on performing business loans, the second on the determinants of non performing business loans. The results confirm our hypothesis. The disadvantage of Italian banks on performing business loans depends on four major factors, where there is a systematic reduction in capital required for business loans to banks: 1) from the core Eurozone countries; 2) using IRB models, not widespread in Italy; 3) from countries with “sector” supervision model (instead Italy has a “hybrid” model); 4) from countries that, unlike Italy, have more efficient insolvency procedures. There are three major factors on the incidence of default, which is lower for banks in countries: 1) that are Eurozone core; 2) with higher GDP growth over 2007-2013; 3) with more efficient insolvency procedures. These results call for system solutions to remove Italian banks. competitive disadvantage, to avert the risk that recovery in investment is stifled by a creeping structural credit crunch. Both financial markets development and improvements in the efficiency of insolvency procedures would help. However, the high road is launching a large-scale plan of government guarantees to support business lending. We argue that this public intervention would unlikely generate costs for the treasury and would be compatible with the public finance balances. Showing that the competitive disadvantage in business loans for Italian banks affects not only retail SMEs but also to corporate SMEs and is greatest for large corporates, we argue that it is necessary, as in Germany, to allow also mid-sized enterprises to access public guarantees. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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121 | Stefano Filomeni, Gregory F. Udell, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Hardening Soft Information: How Far Has Technology Taken Us? [aprile 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Credit scoring, communication problems, bank organization, loan officer discretion | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
G21 | Financial Economics – Financial Institutions and Services – Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages | |||||||||||||||||
L14 | Industrial Organization -Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance – Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation | |||||||||||||||||
D82 | Microeconomics – – Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty – Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
In this paper, we explore the boundaries of soft information. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which soft information can be .hardened. in commercial loan underwriting such that it can be communicated unimpeded across the hierarchical layers of large banking organization. We use a proprietary dataset from a large European bank containing granular loan-level information on the credit score building process and its loan approval decisions. Like other banks, soft information is injected into the process at several points. We find that credit scoring technology does not eliminate the barriers to an unbiased and credible communication of soft information at distance within a banking organization. In addition, we find that firms applying to distantly located branches receive a lower amount of credit than firms with the same score applying to branches closer to the bank office with final approval authority. Our findings confirm the persistence of spatially-based organizational frictions even in the context of a modern credit-scoring based lending technology. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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120 | Giulia Bettin, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
The impact of natural disasters on remittances to low- and middle-income countries [febbraio 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
international migration, migrants’ remittances, natural disasters | ||||||||||||||||||
JEL Classification: | ||||||||||||||||||
F22 | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – International Migration | |||||||||||||||||
F24 | International Economics – International Factor Movements and International Business – Remittances | |||||||||||||||||
Q54 | Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics – Environmental Economics – Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming | |||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
In this paper, we offer novel empirical evidence on the impact of natural disasters on remittance flows towards low- and middle-income countries. We consider a panel of 98 countries over the period 1990-2010. Our findings show that remittances increase after a disaster, thus contributing ex post to the reconstruction process. At the same time, we find that remittances play a key role in terms of ex ante risk preparedness for those countries that experienced more disruptive events in the past. Finally, when taking into account the interaction with the level of development of the local financial sector, remittances seem to substitute for less efficient financial systems both in terms of ex post response to disasters and in terms of ex ante risk management strategy. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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119 | Pietro Alessandrini, Bruno Bracalente, Stefano Casini Benvenuti | |||||||||||||||||
Italia di mezzo: omogeneità originarie e progetto di macroregione sistema [gennaio 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Macroregion, industrial districts, polycentrism, regional integration | ||||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Our purpose is to examine the main economic and social characteristics that could support the proposal of a macroregion called “Italia di mezzo” obtained from the aggregation of Toscana, Umbria e Marche. These three regions present similar path of development, based on common roots of “mezzadria” in agricolture, endogenous industrialization, high propensity to entrepreneurship, industrial districts, high quality of life, polycentric urban structures, outstanding cultural-artistic-historical endowment. On the other hand there are factors of fragility evidentiated by the after-2007 crisis, such as: technological and organizational limits of small firms, delocalization, difficulties in entrepreneurial turnover, signals of in social cohesion’s reduction. The strategic project of the macroregion “Italia di mezzo” must be built on factors of success to consolidate and on fragilities to overcome. The aggregation of the three regions offers several opportunities. Mainly: scale and scope economies, availability and interaction of different motors of development, investment on better infrastructural connections, network of firms and advanced services, touristic circuit of cultural-artistic-historical sites, revitalization of internal depopulated areas. Above all, “Italia di mezzo” has the distinctive character of a macroregion of quality, which is a brand widely recognized to Toscana, Umbria and progressively also to Marche. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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118 | Andrea Bellucci, Alexander Borisov, Alberto Zazzaro | |||||||||||||||||
Bank Organization and Loan Contracting in Small Business Financing [gennaio 2016] | ||||||||||||||||||
Keywords: | ||||||||||||||||||
Authority allocation, Bank organization structure, Small business financing | ||||||||||||||||||
Abstract: | ||||||||||||||||||
Academic research recognizes that the organizational structure of banks could have implications for the financing of small businesses and entrepreneurial firms. In this chapter, we start by reviewing the underlying theoretical motivation and then summarize existing evidence. Overall, it is confirmed that the organization of lending institutions is important for the use and transmission of information, as well as credit availability for small businesses. Moreover, using a unique dataset of bank loans, we empirically document that loan contract characteristics such as interest rates and collateral requirements are sensitive to the hierarchical allocation of decision-making authority within the bank’s organization. | ||||||||||||||||||
Citations: CitEc | ||||||||||||||||||
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